Competing Frameworks and Perspectives on Land Property in Cambodia

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This paper presents the views and reflections of the authors. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the NGO Forum or other organizations.
Abstract

This paper discusses Cambodia’s legal framework relating to Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) and looks at the implementation gaps. It argues that despite Cambodian’s legal framework governing land and ELCs being well-developed, its social benefits, such as protecting the rights of the poor and vulnerable and contributing to transparency and accountability, are almost non-existent. Recent evidence suggests that the Government’s handling of natural resources is a far cry from its official land policy which is “to administer, manage, use and distribute land in an equitable, transparent, efficient, and sustainable manner”. This paper argues that this is due to (1) a large gap between the country’s legal framework and the implementation of the country’s land concession policies and (2) a complete disregard of the country’s customary land rights. It will explain that the current political environment benefits the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. Widespread corruption and nepotism encourages growing inequality in land ownership and a significant power imbalance between small groups of powerful, politically and economically well-connected elites and poor and vulnerable people in Cambodia. This is exacerbated by the lack of implementation of appropriate regulations. This elite exercises control over the judiciary and has created a climate of impunity, thus hindering the overall implementation of the legal framework and serving their own interests. The paper will further look into recent Government actions such as the moratorium on ELCs and a new land titling initiative and assess whether these actions have the potential to reverse or perpetuate the current inequality in land holdings.

I. Introduction

Land is the most valuable resource for the citizens of Cambodia. Approximately 21% of the land is arable¹ and about 80% of the population lives in rural areas, mostly depending on agriculture as the main source of their livelihood. Agriculture employs 60% of the total labor force and contributes to 33% of the Gross National Product (GNP). Land is the necessary foundation to ensure the livelihood for its population, which holds especially true for forest dependent communities and indigenous communities. The Royal Government of Cambodia’s (RGC) underlying official land policy is “to administer, manage, use and distribute land in an equitable, transparent, efficient, and sustainable manner in order to contribute to ensuring food security, natural resources and environmental protection, national defense and socio-economic development in the context of market economy”².

During the Khmer Rouge Period from 1975-1979, private land ownership was abolished, and all cadastral documents were destroyed.³ Systematic land registration has only been taken up again in the 21st century with major assistance from international donors. The new Land Law of 2001 introduced new property rights categories, such as state public land (mostly forested areas) and state private land (land that can be converted into various forms of concessions). Yet, to date, no clear demarcation between state public and state private land exists. Most state private land has been allocated to domestic and foreign investors in the form of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs).

¹ http://geography.about.com/library/cia/blccambodia.htm, data refers to 2005
³ E.g. Christoph Sperfeldt, Farrah Tek, Billy Chia-Lung Tai, An Examination of Policies Promoting Large Scale Investments in Farmland in Cambodia, Submitted to the Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (CHRAC), November 2012
While poverty has been reduced by 17% from 47% in 1997 to 30% in 2007, it is estimated that 92% of the Cambodian poor live in rural and therefore agricultural areas. From 2007-2010, an increase in poverty was likely between 1-4% due to economic downturn in 2009, which illustrates that reducing rural poverty is still a challenge for Cambodia. New data indicates that in 2010 21.1% of the population lived in poverty and this further declined to 19.8% in 2011. The same report distinguished between rural and urban poverty and puts the rate in rural areas at 24.9%. While exact data on landlessness and land poverty is not available, the UNDP estimates that 25% of rural poor are landless with an increase of 2% per annum. In addition, 40% of the rural poor are estimated to be land-poor as they do not possess more than 0.5 ha per household, which does not allow them to grow sufficient food to meet their nutritional needs.

In its aim to reduce rural poverty and to meet the Cambodian Millennium Development Goals by 2015, the RGC views the enhancement of the productivity and development of the agricultural sector as most important. One mechanism that the RGC has deployed in an attempt to achieve this is the granting of ELCs. Art 3, Para 3 of the Sub Decree on ELCs further specifies the objectives to grant ELCs “To increase employment in rural areas within a framework of intensification and diversification of livelihood opportunities and within a framework of natural resource management based on appropriate ecological system”.

Prospects and approaches for future national development are described in the National Strategic Development Plan. The plan for 2014-2018 is currently being drafted and according to the concept note of approaching the National Strategic Development Plan 2014-2018, agriculture and land still plays a major role. Point 2.29 speaks about Land and capital: Despite sensitive issues around land, there is still a lot of possibility to convert land into capital for high value addition. Growth in landlessness among farmers is not increasing and also people in the coming generations want jobs and livelihoods outside agriculture. The option to use land more optimally, therefore, is high now. Agriculture “must become one of the important engines of growth in the future”.

This paper discusses experiences made surrounding “Economic Land Concessions” (ELCs) in Cambodia and a recent government initiative to re-allocate some of the ELC area to the rural poor. ELCs are per definition “a mechanism to grant private state land through a specific economic land concession contract to a concessionaire to use for agricultural and industrial-agricultural exploitation”. It is therefore a

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6 Royal Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning Poverty in Cambodia – A New Approach, Redefining the Poverty Line, Phnom Penh, April 2013, p. 12. It needs to be noted that this data was drawn from a newly defined poverty line.
8 GTZ, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Land in Cambodia, 2009
9 Royal Government of Cambodia, National Strategic Development Plan Update 2009-2013, p. 121.
right to occupy private state land for agricultural and industrial-agricultural exploitation, serving economic purposes. Art. 2 further defines: “Industrial-agricultural exploitation as referring to:

- cultivation of food crops or industrial crops including tree planting to be tree plantation.
- raising of animals and aquaculture.
- construction such as a plant or factory and facilities for the processing of domestic agricultural raw materials, or
- a combination of some or all of the above activities”.

Other concessions which exist under the Cambodian law are Use, Development or Exploitation Concessions (UDEC) such as mining concessions, port concessions, airport concessions, industrial development concessions or fishing concessions. These concessions are different from ELCs and do not fall within the scope of this paper.

II. Land Concessions in Cambodia in a Historical Perspective

While land concessions came under scrutiny only in the last couple of years, the system of granting concessions was introduced under the French colonial system. The first land concessions in French Indochina were initiated by decree in 1874 that enabled colonial authorities to grant ‘unoccupied’ land to concessionaires under condition that it be under complete cultivation within three years (Slocomb 2007). In 1899, the Governor-General of Indochina issued a legislative order that regulated the allocation of rural land concessions to French nationals (Doumer 1899). As Slocomb (2007: 18f) states “[t]he land concession system was arguably the most blatant expression of colonial power in French Indochina, a blunt instrument wielded for the single-minded ambition of capital.” By that time, concessions were mainly small size.

The system of land concessions was continued after independence. Under the Khmer Rouge regime, granting of land concessions ceased and private land ownership was abolished. Only after the introduction of the land law of 1992 the system of granting land concessions was reintroduced. The objectives of these concessions were similar to those postulated later, namely to create state revenue and reduce poverty. The law also provided for the possibility to grant forest concessions. From 1993 to 2002 more than 30 forestry concession zones were created, covering about 6.5 million hectares and approximately 70% of the forest cover (McKenney et al. 2004; see Figure 1). The system caused widespread forest degradation, was criticized by international donors and development banks and was finally abolished in 2002. With the enactment of the Land Law 2001, and the Sub decree on ELCs a more formalized framework governing land concessions was installed.

12 Art. 3 Sub Decree on Economic Land Concession, Royal Government of Cambodia, No. 146 ANK/BK, 27.12.2005
13 Art. 50 Land Law
14 For more information on the historical background, see Christoph Sperfeldt, Farrah Tek, Billy Chia-Lung Tai, An Examination of Policies Promoting Large Scale Investments in Farmland in Cambodia, Submitted to the Cambodian Human Rights Action Committee (CHRAC), November 2012, pp. 20-21.
Figure 1. Forest concessions in Cambodia in 2001

Note: The concessions depicted in light green were cancelled in 2001.

Source: DANIDA 2007

III. Legal Framework

The Land Law of 2001 and the Sub decree on Economic Land Concessions issued in 2005 both govern the granting of land concessions. While the 2001 Land Law sets forth general provisions relevant for all land concessions, including those for social and economic purposes (Art. 48-62), the Sub-Decree on Economic Land Concessions lays out the legal requirements for granting an ELC. Article 4 stipulates that “An ELC may be granted only on a land that meets all of the following five criteria:

1- The land that has been registered and classified as state private land in accordance with the sub-decree on State Land Management and the Sub-decree on Procedures for establishing Cadastral Maps and Land Register or Sub-decree on Sporadic Registration.

2- A Land Use Plan for the land has been adopted by the Provincial-Municipal State Land Management Committee and the Land Use is consistent with the plan.

3- Environmental and Social Impact Assessments have been completed with respect to the Land Use and Development Plan for ELC Projects.

4- Land that has solutions for resettlement issues, in accordance with the existing legal framework and Procedure. The contracting authority shall ensure that there will not be involuntary resettlement of lawful land holders and that access to private land shall be respected.

5- Land for which there have been public consultations, with regard to ELC projects or proposals, with territorial authorities and residents of the locality.”
The maximum size of an Economic Land Concession (ELC) is 10,000 ha\textsuperscript{15}, and the maximum duration of an ELC is 99 years.\textsuperscript{16} Details need to be established by a concession contract between the concessionaire and the contracting authority.\textsuperscript{17} A land concession is conditional as it must comply with the provisions of the 2001 Land Law and the concession contract.\textsuperscript{18} It is revocable through governmental decision or can be cancelled by the courts when its legal requirements are not complied with.\textsuperscript{19} An ELC can be acquired by foreign entities or Cambodian entities which are 100% foreign owned. These can propose an ELC project to the relevant authorities,\textsuperscript{20} which is one permissible way to initiate such project. In addition, the Contracting Authority can also propose an ELC project for solicitation of proposals from investors.

Art. 58 of the 2001 Land Law further states that “[t]he land concession may not violate roadways or transportation ways or sidewalks or their borders and the ground necessary for their maintenance, nor to waterways, pools, ponds and water reserves to be used by the people in their daily lives. “According to the available concession contracts, it seems that the Contracting Authority protects the interests of the local people by not allowing the company to get hold of the lands that are lawfully possessed by the people and lands that are under family agricultural production, and encouraging joint land development between the people and the company if mutually agreed”.\textsuperscript{21} For instance, the concession contract lays out that “... lands that are being used for family agricultural production must be deducted from the granted ELC”.

The authority to grant an ELC lies with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (MAFF).\textsuperscript{22} Previously it was possible for sub-national authorities\textsuperscript{23} to grant smaller ELCs up to 1,000 ha\textsuperscript{24}, but this option was terminated in 2008.\textsuperscript{25} It is interesting, though, that MAFF is not the only body granting ELCs despite the fact the Sub Decree on ELCs only mandates MAFF. In fact, ELCs can be granted by any public entity that owns land.\textsuperscript{26} In recent years, ELCs have been increasingly granted by the Ministry of Environment (MOE), which is responsible for the administration of Cambodia’s protected areas\textsuperscript{27}. ELCs granted by MOE lie within protected areas. In practice, the Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM), the RGCs top executive organ, administered by the Cambodian head of government, approves the granting of ELCs.\textsuperscript{28

\textsuperscript{15} Art. 59 Land Law
\textsuperscript{16} Art. 61 Land Law
\textsuperscript{17} Art. 53 f Land Law, Art. 23 f. Sub Decree on ELC
\textsuperscript{18} Art. 54 Land Law
\textsuperscript{19} Art 55 Land Law
\textsuperscript{20} Art. 8 Sub Decree on ELC
\textsuperscript{21} See also the report “Economic Land Concessions and Local Communities” by Ngo Sothath and Chan Sophal, Cambodian Economic Association, In cooperation with NGO Forum on Cambodia, Phnom Penh, December 2010, p. 40
\textsuperscript{22} Art 29 Sub Decree on Economic Land Concession, Royal Government of Cambodia, No. 146 ANK/BK, 27.12.2005
\textsuperscript{23} Provincial and municipal governors
\textsuperscript{24} Art 29 II Sub Decree on Economic Land Concession, Royal Government of Cambodia, No. 146 ANK/BK, 27.12.2005
\textsuperscript{25} Art 1, Sub Decree on Modification of the Sub Decree on Economic Land Concessions 2008
\textsuperscript{27} Protected Area Law, 2008
\textsuperscript{28} Economic Land Concessions and Local Communities” by Ngo Sothath and Chan Sophal, Cambodian Economic Association, In Cooperation with NGO Forum on Cambodia, Phnom Penh, December 2010, p. 4.
ELCs can only be granted on State Private Land, whereas State Public Land cannot be subject to sale or transfer, and cannot be the subject of an economic concession. Compared to State Private Land, State Public Land is characterized by its use in the public interest and Art. 15 of the 2001 Land Law lists all property falling into this category, such as forests, courses of water, lakes, harbors, railways, roads and others. It needs to be noted that it is legally possible to change the property’s classification, if the property has lost its public interest. State Public Land can be reclassified as State Private Land by a Sub-Decree, which needs to be adopted by the Council of Ministers (COM) and signed by the head of the RGC. It further needs to be registered with the Cadastral Administration to be effective. The relevant Sub-Decree is then published in the Royal Gazette which is the official national promulgating organ in Cambodia.

Rental fees for concessionaires are low and lie between 2-10 USD per hectare, depending on the land quality. In comparison, rental fees among locals range from 100-250 USD per hectare. Loehr argues that due to the “ridiculously low” fees, such concessions are “even more advantageous for investors than full property titles, because the holder does not have to pay a purchase price.” It further exemplifies that rental fees for concessionaires are decoupled from the value of the land and illustrates a structural preferential treatment of investors. One could argue that prices for land have to remain low to attract investment; however, state revenue could be much higher if this land would be leased to local farmers. This would allow a higher productivity of the land and it provide more employment opportunities, aside from the fact that the commodities produced could be benefitting the national market, thus contributing to local food security.

IV. Implementation in Practice

As seen above, the law provides various social and environmental safeguards. Yet, in practice, the legal requirements for granting ELCs have often not been complied with. For instance, ELCs have been granted on state public land and the reclassification to state private land occurred only after the granting process. In several cases, the maximum size of ELCs has been bypassed by granting land which neighbors each plot to concessionaires which are de facto controlled by one person or company. ELCs have not been consistent with the land use plan, if such a plan exists. In other cases, environmental and social impact assessments have not been conducted or were of low quality. Many studies confirm that legally

29 Art 2, 4 Sub Decree on Economic Land Concession, Royal Government of Cambodia, No. 146 ANK/BK, 27.12.2005
30 Art 15,16, Land Law 2001
31 Art 16 Land Law 2001
33 Ngo, Sotath, Chan, Sophal, Cambodian Economic Association in cooperation with the NGO Forum on Cambodia and ActionAid Cambodia “Agriculture Sector Financing and Services for Smallholder Farmers” Phnom Penh, 2010, p. 34
34 Loehr, Dirk, Land Reforms and the Tragedy of the Anticommons—A Case Study from Cambodia, 2012
required consultations with affected villagers were not conducted.\textsuperscript{38} Besides the clause in the concession contract that lands being used from agricultural production must be deducted from the granted ELC, no solutions were provided for local villagers.\textsuperscript{39} In fact, thousands of local villagers have been evicted to make way for concessions.\textsuperscript{40} ELCs were granted by national authorities and in many instances, provincial and local authorities were not aware that a concession has been granted in their administrative area. ELCs have been granted in protected forest areas, after the reclassification to sustainable use zones according to the law on Protected Areas 2008, which allows economic activities in these areas according to Art. 11 III. It has been stated that some concessionaires have no real interest to use the land for agro-industrial purposes, as they only seek to log the valuable timber.\textsuperscript{41}

The authors are not aware of a single ELC which has been granted according to the by-law favoring solicited proposal. Unsolicited proposals initiated by investors are the norm. This means that it is the investors that are seeking land areas suitable for the production of crops or for timber exploitation rather than authorities identifying suitable land for investment. This practice inhibits a comprehensive land use planning by the sub-level authorities (provincial and local). In principle, the Cambodian Constitution protects the independence and impartiality of the countries courts and postulates a regime of rule of law.\textsuperscript{42} The execution and protection of the law rests with the State’s executive and judiciary branches according to the principles of separation of powers. Yet local communities face challenges when exercising their rights in court proceedings. There is a structural imbalance between local farmers, who often even lack money to access the court system as they cannot pay the necessary fees, while investors are often backed by multinational companies. Among the 157 land dispute cases involving agricultural land recorded by the NGO Forum, only 46 cases or 29.2\% were partly or fully resolved, compared to 42.2\% partly or fully resolved disputes over residential land.\textsuperscript{44} This indicates that courts are less likely to process complaints or lawsuits involving concessionaires. On contrast, local villagers are subject to court proceedings if they exercise their rights on land claimed by concessionaires. The major threat for the independence of the jurisdiction stems from the predominantly exercised control by the executive and its associated investors and rich and powerful businessmen over the courts. The legal system of Cambodia has long been criticized of being partial and corrupt and there is little evidence that this might change.\textsuperscript{45} In fact, the US Country Report on Human Rights Practices in 2012 confirms “A weak

\textsuperscript{38} E.g. MH Ethanol, see Lee, Ji-Sook, Moving Beyond Misconceptions, MH- Ethanol – Case Study of a Korean agro – industrial investment in Cambodia, p. 29; Kachoak Village, Kok Commune, Barkaev District, Ratanakiri; Rithy Theavy Visna company and Heng Brothers Company in Malik Village, Malik Commune, Andong Meas District, Ratanakiri; Sovann Reachsey Co. Ltd. And Mong Rethy in Chhnaeng Village, Srae Khtum Commune, Kaev Seima District, Mondulkiri, see Mark Kavenagh, Dom Renfrey & Erin Flynn, Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Development Process in Indigenous People Communities of Mondulkiri and Ratanakiri province, NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2012, p. 18-27
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid
\textsuperscript{40} For cases in Koh Kong, Kampong Speu and Oddar Meanchey see Pred, David, “Bittersweet. A briefing paper on Industrial Sugar Production, Trade and Human Rights in Cambodia” Bridges Across Borders Cambodia, 2010,p 4, 7
\textsuperscript{41} Representative of the Mong Rethy Group, April 2013
\textsuperscript{42} Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, Art. 109, 111
\textsuperscript{43} NGO Forum on Cambodia, Statistical Analyses of Land Disputes in Cambodia, 2011, p.28 (not yet published)
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid
judiciary that sometimes failed to provide due process or a fair trial procedure [...]. The courts [...] were subject to corruption and political influence.46

V. Economic Land Concessions: Figures and Impacts

Accurate information on ELCs is not available and different actors operate with varying numbers, which sometimes may be due to different methodologies in documenting ELCs. According to the latest information from the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, from 1996 until now the government – namely MAFF and MOE – has granted a total area of 1.5 million hectares of ELCs to 117 companies.47

ADHOC48 documented that by December 2012 the RGC had granted or reserved at least 2,657,470 ha of land to investors for ELC purposes, of which 381,121 hectares were recorded in 2012 alone. ADHOC also reported that out of these 381,121, at least 272,597 hectares were granted or reclassified in protected areas.49 Furthermore, large parts of 28 Cambodian islands were reclassified as State Private Land between 2008 and 2010 and granted to concessionaires to build tourism resorts and casinos.

According to the latest data from another human rights organization, LICADHO, ELCs covered 2,289,490 ha by April 2013, which is equivalent to 63.46 % percent of Cambodia’s arable land50. In addition, 2,027,979 hectares of mining concessions have been recorded. Thus, according to LICADHO, mining and economic land concessions together cover 4,317,469 hectares or 24.46 percent of Cambodia’s surface area. Figure 2 depicts the land size occupied by ELCs and other concessions, showing to what massive extent concessions have been granted. Due to the extended lease times, which range from 70 to 99 years, this land will not be available for rural communities for farming and cultivation to support their food security in the foreseeable future.

The NGO Forum on Cambodia51 estimates that 25.7% or 73 cases of ongoing recorded 284 land disputes in 2011 were attributable to ELCs and that 62.2% of all disputes have occurred over agricultural land. Land disputes attributed to ELCs were more prevalent in the eastern parts of the country and in areas where rubber is commonly grown.52

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47 http://www.cen.com.kh/localnews/show_detail/19?token=YjMxZTQ4ZT; according to the statement, among the 117 ELC companies are 39 Cambodian companies occupying 593,000 ha. Vietnamese, Chinese, South Korean, Thai, American, Indian and Malaysian companies are the predominant foreign investors.
48 ADHOC, A turning Point? Land, Housing and Natural Resources - Rights in Cambodia in 2012, February 2013, pp. 1, 10.
50 Ibid, p. 10
51 NGO Forum on Cambodia, Statistical Analyses of Land Disputes in Cambodia, 2011, Pg.18, 23 (not yet published)
52 Ibid, p. 23. In the provinces of Kratie, Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, and Kampong Cham more than five disputes were recorded. Kampong Speu and Kampong Thom provinces also recorded large numbers of disputes due to conflict between local people and ELCs.
Contrary to the officially stated goals of reducing poverty, the granting of ELCs “are found to be a source of widespread, systematic human rights violations such as forced evictions and deprivation from right to adequate housing, access to land and right to food, contributing to environmental destruction.”

The Special Rapporteur’s report validates the large number of previous reports that described the ELCs’ negative impacts. For a detailed description of the impacts we therefore refer to the Special Rapporteur report and others with additional references. While ELCs have been a root cause of forced evictions in the past, 2012 marked a distressing climax when a 14-year old girl was shot dead when security forces stormed a village in Kampong Domrey commune, Kratie province, which has been involved in a land dispute with a concessionaire.

Figure 2. Economic Land Concessions and Mining Concessions in Cambodia (April 2013)
Source: Map provided by LICADHO

With the equivalent of 63.46% of agricultural land not available for local farmers, the food security for the upcoming generations of Cambodians is put at risk. The dispossession of local farmers contributes

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to an increase of the rural poor and a social transformation of former land possessors to landless and land-poor people that depend on selling their labor force. The situation has been described by international blogs and media with headlines, such as “The great Cambodian giveaway” and “Conflicts over land have taken a dangerous turn.” 55 Besides the environmental impacts such as the pollution of water resources,56, soil erosion57 and degrading pristine forest areas to agricultural land, illegal logging outside the granted concession area has also been attributed to ELCs. In Ratanakiri’s Lumphat Wildlife Sanctuary, the illegal logging of approximately 16,000 trees which could sell for 100 Mio USD was discovered recently.58 The illegal logs had been transported by trucks into the concession area.59 As logging in concession areas is legal, the logs were to be declared as originating from the concession area and then legally exported and sold, which is a well-known and common practice.

As a result of the rampant allocation of ELCS, 20%-30% of Cambodia’s land resources have been progressively concentrated into the hands of only 1% of the population, mostly at the expense of the weakest and most marginalized groups in rural areas.60 The UNDP (2007) argues that “the sudden liberalization of land markets from 1989 onward, without first putting in place adequate institutional safeguards, laws and effective governance, left these weaker and less-informed members of society highly vulnerable to unregulated market forces and information asymmetries – to the advantage of the better informed, influential and powerful”.61

VI. The Ambiguous Role of International Donors

Since 1992, various multilateral and bilateral donors have supported Cambodia, which continues to have a high dependence on donor aid, with almost half of its total annual budget being sourced from international donors. From 1992 to 2009, aid disbursements totaled 9.79 billion USD.62 The European Union was the largest donor with a share of 23.2%.63 From 2001 to 2009, the trend of disbursement of aid was upward from approx. 420 Mio USD to 900 Mio USD in 2009, mostly in the form of grants (71% compared to only 29% in loans). Recently, China has emerged as the most important donor country.

A major donor-funded program was the Land Management and Administration Project (LMAP) which supported systematic land registration in 15 of Cambodia’s 24 provinces. As of September 2011, the systematic land registration program, administered by the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction and supported by a consortium of international aid agencies, delivered land

54 MSD estimates an annual growth rate of 1.54 percent and expects the population to double within less than 30 years, see http://www.msd.com.kh/cambodia/
55 Pilorge, Naly, Anti-Corruption Views - The great Cambodian giveaway. URL: http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/blogs/anti-corruption-views/the-great-cambodian-giveaway, 21 September 2012; Pilorge, Naly, Conflict over Land in Cambodia is taking a dangerous turn, The Guardian, 25 September 2012
56 Moving Beyond Misconceptions, MH- Ethanol – Case Study of a Korean agro – industrial investment in Cambodia, p. 37
57 Üllenberg, A. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Land in Cambodia, 2009, GTZ merged with DED and Inwent in 2011 and is now called Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH
58 The Phnom Penh Post, April 26, 2013, p. 1-2
59 Ibid
60 United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), Local Development Outlook Cambodia, 2010
61 UNDP (2007), Expanding Choices for Rural People, p. 11.
62 Aid Effectiveness Project in the Development Issues Programme, NGO Forum on Cambodia, Fact Sheet on Terms of Assistance of Foreign Concessional Loans to Cambodia, 2010, p. 1
63 Ibid
titles for a total of 1,740,839 plots of land. Hailed as a great success by the RGC and international donors, human rights advocates and civil society groups argue that this program has only concentrated on the least conflict-prone areas of the country. According to official statements, efforts are now underway which aim at accelerating SLR and avoiding the exclusion of areas from the process.

In view of the increasing number of land disputes, tenure insecurity and human rights violations, the donors’ involvement in the land reform policies of the RGC has become increasingly ambiguous. Even some development partners concede that land distribution for the rural poor has mostly been a failure.

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Donor countries have been confronted by their own parliaments and civil society groups with the question why they continue to provide financial support to the contentious land registration program in Cambodia. However, this did not lead to a substantial change in the donors’ commitment to date. Neef et al. (2013) argue that “international aid agencies involved in the land reform sector have unwillingly become accomplices of government elites that have proven increasingly unaccountable to the rural poor.”

The World Bank’s ambivalent stance on foreign direct investment in agricultural land has become apparent in a number of recent statements. On the one hand, World Bank officials concede that “[u]sable land is in short supply, and there are too many instances of speculators and unscrupulous investors exploiting smallholder farmers, herders, and others who lack the power to stand up for their rights. This is particularly true in countries with weak land governance systems.” Yet, at the same time, the Bank “called for substantial new investment in agriculture - in smallholders and large farms - from both the public and private sectors” to feed a growing global population. The statement suggests that the World Bank – while also emphasizing support for smallholders – is not about to change its policy to support large-scale land acquisitions. The World Bank’s continued endorsement of additional large-scale investments does not include credible remedies for deficient and weak land governance regimes in the countries targeted by investors. Hence, violation of laws and human rights are likely to continue in connection with large-scale land investments.

VII. A Turning Point? Cambodia’s Moratorium on Concessions and the New Titling Scheme

In May 2012, the Royal Government of Cambodia declared a moratorium on the granting of ELCs and announced a review of existing ELCs, combined with a new titling scheme, which is currently being implemented and aims to grant land titles to 470,000 households on 1.8 million ha, living in ELC and

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68 Ibid
69 As coined by ADHOC
70 Directive 01 on Measure to Strengthen and Foster Effectiveness of ELC Management, dated 07 May 2012 (Khmer version), available at http://mlmupc.gov.kh/?page=detail&menu1=118&ctype=article&id=118&lg=kh
71 As announced by the Cambodian Prime Minister on June 14, 2012 “ New Actions on Existing Policies”
forest concession areas as well as on state public land. By 4 May 2013, 226,525 land titles were distributed to beneficiaries. The new titling scheme is carried out by close to 2,000 official staff and a similar number of student volunteers in 20 provinces of Cambodia. Neither civil society groups nor development partners have been allowed to monitor the implementation. The moratorium and the new titling scheme were welcomed by civil society as a much needed initiative to strengthen tenure security. At the same time, civil society discussed concerns over the deployment of the volunteers, in large part because of a lack of transparency surrounding the process and the volunteers wearing military uniforms and being transported on military trucks. Local reports indicated that villagers felt intimidated by the appearance of the volunteers. Civil society groups discussed potential impacts on land tenure of private landholders, land use and conservation, the rule of law and implementation of the existing legal framework governing land management and use and community cohesion and stability.

The legal background of this new titling scheme or “new action based on old policies” as it is described by the government rests in the issuance of the Directive 01 BorBor, a “Directive on Measures to Strengthen and Foster Effectiveness of ELC management.”

“1. To temporarily postpone granting economic land concessions;

2. Ministries, institutions and authorities with relevant competence shall execute the decision of the Royal Government on granting ELCs and pay attention to implement contracts on ELCs, particularly to implement the tiger-skin formula policy (explained in more detail below) and not to affect communal land and livelihood of citizens, aiming to insure these ELCs produce tangible benefits for the nation and its citizens sustainably.

3. For companies already possessing government permits but failing to comply with applicable procedures and contracts, by logging without developing the ELC, encroaching on extra land, leaving the land vacant for resale, proceeding with transactions contrary to terms of contract, encroaching on lands of citizens or communities, the Royal Government will withdraw those ELCs. Those withdrawn lands will be placed under direct control of the state.

4. Regarding ELCs which received permits in principle from the Royal Government prior to the issuance of this regulation shall proceed to comply with applicable laws and procedure.”

Directive 01 calls for increased monitoring of ELCs and reinforced the concept of the “tiger (or leopard)-skin policy”, which basically means that land inhabited by farmers must be cut out of the concession

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72 Speech of H.E. Im Chhun Lim, Senior Minister and Minister of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction and Chairman of the Council for Land Policy, Phnom Penh, September 26, 2012 (unofficial translation)
73 Most of them have worked on the Systematic Land Registration process before Directive 01. Consequently, the process of Systematic Land Registration has slowed down.
74 Not included are Phnom Penh, Kandal, Prey Veng and Pailin.
75 NGO Position Papers on Cambodia’s Development in 2010-2012. Monitoring the Implementation of the National Strategic Development Plan and the 2010 CDCC Joint Monitoring Indicators, September 2012, the NGO Forum on Cambodia, pp. 72, 85; ADHOC, p. 34
76 NGO Meeting, Phnom Penh, 29 June 2012
77 NGO Meeting, Phnom Penh, 29 June 2012. Development Partners were informed about these concerns through the Technical Working Group. The Technical Working Group on Land is a body comprised of Development Partners, Civil Society and Government Representatives to coordinate their work on land issues.
78 Unofficial translation
areas – leaving the cultivated areas resembling the pattern of a leopard skin. This concept was already a component of the lease agreements. Point 4 of the Directive allows the continuation of granting ELCs which have been permitted by the Government prior to the issuing of the moratorium dated 07. May 2012, but no information is available regarding how many ELCs had received approval. According to RGC, ELCs that have been approved after Directive 01 are those that were already approved in principle and were just waiting for final approval.

While the human rights group ADHOC counted 33 ELCs which have been approved since the moratorium, the royal gazette reports that only 15 new ELCs have been granted. According to official records, no ELCs have been granted since December 2012 which has been interpreted by some observers that the moratorium has been effective in stopping new concessions after December. While no information is available on how many ELCs have been cancelled, 105 sub decrees were issued until the end of January 2013, excising land from ELCs, logging concessions, forest covered areas, protected and other areas. The excised land was mostly reclassified as state private land and subsequently awarded to villagers who occupied, used and cultivated the land.

According to the government, the campaign “seeks to resolve and legalize unclear land occupation through the donation of ownership rights, the granting of small-scale ELCs or social land concessions in order to ensure tenure security; to resolve land conflicts [...].” Land areas, which are not identified and demarcated as private plots are considered to be state land. Thus, demarcating private plots by the initiative helps to identify state private and state public land and contributes to mapping out state public land. It further aims at creating a state land inventory to identify land for future social land concessions.

The new titling scheme is based on with the assumption that the titles are being issued in areas where people do not have possession rights, i.e. are considered illegal occupants by existing law. An analysis of whether the title recipients were indeed “illegal” prior to the implementation of Directive 01 has yet to be made. The directive does not mention a certain size limitation of private plots. In fact, the volunteers are ordered to only demarcate up to 5 ha of land for private titles per farm household. Indeed the limitation was announced in the Senior Ministers speech and was mentioned in an RGC instruction from 1989 on the implementation of Land Use and Management Policy as the legal basis for granting possession rights on land for agricultural production. Farmers who own bigger land plots can receive a “small scale ELC” up to a maximum of 200 ha for their remaining land.

There has been confusion whether D01 is actually implemented in disputed areas. According to official statements by MLMUPC senior staff this is not the case, because disputes have to be solved first through

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79 ADHOC, p. 34
80 E.g. Müller, Franz Volker and Zülsdorf, Günther: Old Policies – New Action: A Surprising Political Initiative to Recognize Human Rights in the Cambodian Land Reform, p. 6
81 According to the Royal Gazette
82 Speech of H.E. Im Chhun Lim, Senior Minister and Minister of Land Management, Urban Planning and Construction and Chairman of the Council for Land Policy, Phnom Penh, September 26, 2012 (unofficial translation)
83 MLMUPC, August 2012
84 Ibid
85 Please see footnote 64
86 Instruction (Sechkdey Nainom) on Implementation of Land Use and Management Policy, Council of Minister, No. 03 SNN, 03. June 1989
existing mechanisms. Yet the wording of the statement somehow can be interpreted in the sense that D01 provides the basis for land titling for villagers involved in a dispute with concessionaires. Reports from the field indicate that in certain cases disputed land has been demarcated, while not in other cases. This lends credence to the interpretation that the RGC views D01 more as a mechanism to prevent future land disputes, rather than solving ongoing ones.

The statement emphasized that with regard to indigenous peoples, “their rights are respected” and that the initiative will also demarcate and register communal land for those IP communities in the process of communal land titling. Students were instructed to be careful about IP Land. Under the 2001 Land Law, IP communities can receive communal land titles (CLT). The process is threefold and requires IP communities first to recognize the identity of IPs as a collective group with the recognition granted by the Ministry of Rural development (MRD); second, they need to register as legal entities with the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and, third, they are required to measure and demarcate the land with MLMUPC. Communal land titles include IPs’ residential, agricultural, shifting agricultural and spirit and burial forest land. As a consequence of accepting private titles limited to 5 ha, IPs will lose access to many of their traditional lands and leave them open to commercial exploitation as they effectively give up their rights to these areas. However, the process of CLT has proven complicated and lengthy and up to now, 5 IP communities have received a communal land title, two in Ratanakiri, three in Mondulkiri, and three more are pending.

Directive 01 was complemented subsequently by other directives and instructions which added detail to the original provisions. Instruction 15 on the implementation of the Directive 01 outlined the Directive’s application on indigenous peoples’ land. It reaffirmed that only the regulations for collective land registration shall be followed by the student volunteers for those IP communities that are already registered as a legal entity with the Mol or those communities whose request is pending with the Mol. In other words, Instruction 15 ordered the volunteers not to issue private titles to those members of IP communities, who successfully achieved the second step of CLT or are in the process of doing so.

The implementation of Directive 01 has progressed with great speed, and human resources allocated for it are greater than those for the regular Systematic Land Registration process. Hence, it would appear

87 MLMUPC, August 2012
88 Land was not demarcated for villagers involved in a land dispute in Koh Kong with the Union Development Group, and, also in Koh Kong, with the Koh Kong Plantation Company. Villagers in a dispute with NGO Wild Aid – also in Koh Kong- had their land demarcated; see ADHOC "ADHOC, A Turning Point? Land, Housing and Natural Resources - Rights in Cambodia in 2012, February 2013, p. 35
89 MLMUPC, August 2012
90 See also NGO Position Papers on Cambodia’s Development in 2010-2012. Monitoring the Implementation of the National Strategic Development Plan and the 2010 CDCF Joint Monitoring Indicators, September 2012, the NGO Forum on Cambodia, pp. 77, 78, 82, 83 for more details
91 MLMUPC, May 2013
92 Instruction No 15 on the implementation of the Royal Government’s Directive No. 01 BorBor, dated 07 May 2012 on the strengthening and increasing the effective management of Economic land concession in areas of indigenous communities; evergreen forest, semi-evergreen forest, dense forest; and in areas of national defense bases and historical and cultural heritage sites, Supreme Council of State Reform, Council for Land Policy, Phnom Penh, 04 July 2012 (unofficial UNOCHCR translation)
93 Sub Decree 83
that Directive 01 had the potential to speed up the communal land titling process, as volunteers deployed in areas inhabited by IPs would have been able to rapidly demarcate communal land. However, with reference to IP communities who have not yet been registered as a legal entity by MOI yet, the instruction stated also that “individual indigenous people who do not join as member of the community and wish to live privately” can apply for private land titles provided by Directive 01. Instruction 20\textsuperscript{94} thus overruled Instruction 15 and postponed communal land titling to a later stage due to the lengthy process of boundary demarcation and for budget reasons.

Field research carried out in Ratanakiri by a consortium of NGOs revealed that the Directive holds negative impacts to indigenous peoples. Villagers reported of being pressured to accept private titles and of being forced to decide whether to accept them without adequate time for consideration, thus creating division within communities.\textsuperscript{95} For those communities who were already in the process of receiving CLT, the process was halted. Villagers were reportedly told that if they do not accept private titles they will receive nothing at all, and authorities declared that in such case any disputes would not be resolved for villagers.\textsuperscript{96} As communal land was not demarcated, in several cases concession companies cleared communities’ common land after private plots had been titled, causing additional land loss.\textsuperscript{97} Similar impacts were reported from Mondulkiri. There, indigenous community members also accepted private titles after the student volunteers told them that the communal land titling process had been stopped. Some were told that accepting private titles would not hamper their future claim to communal land titles. Additional irregularities were reported from Bousra commune in Mondulkiri. People outside of the commune came and asked to have land registered in their name. They paid the volunteer teams money to receive a land title, and community members felt that the requests of outsiders were prioritised. The community members felt that if they wanted their land to be measured they also needed to pay. Therefore, some community members paid the volunteers teams each around 50 USD or invited them for drinks and/or food. Community members who did not have the means to do so felt that they had no chance to have their land measured. IP community members who received private titles later tried to nullify them\textsuperscript{98} and others want to convert private titles into collective ones.

It could be argued that these negative impacts on indigenous peoples’ efforts to receive communal land titles are occasional events, unintentional and due to “misunderstandings” on behalf of the IP as well as the student volunteers on the concept of communal land titling and private titles. However, a spokesperson of the MLMUPC was quoted by local media saying: “We have to push all the minority people to register for private land titles to protect their land and stop the disputes with economic land concessions”.\textsuperscript{99} Communal land not covered by private titles would be granted to the companies, a practice that the spokesperson defended with the following view: “I do not think this is unfair for the

\textsuperscript{94} Instruction No. 020 on the implementation of the Royal Government’s Directive No. 01 BB, dated 07 May 2012 on the strengthening and increasing the effective management of Economic land concession in areas of indigenous communities. Supreme Council of State Reform, Council of Land Policy, Phnom Penh, 26 July 2012 (unofficial UNOCHCR translation)
\textsuperscript{95} Rabe, Alison: Directive 01BB in Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia: Issues and impacts of private land titling in indigenous communities, 2013, p. 18
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid, p. 7
\textsuperscript{98} Leemann, Esther: Short Report on Committee Members of the 7 Indigenous Communities of Busra Commune (Pu Tuet, Pu Reang, Bu Sra, Pu Til, Lammeh, Pu Char, Pu Lu) trying to Nullify Private Land Titles. 2013,
\textsuperscript{99} The Cambodian Daily, April 24, 2013, p. 18
ethic minorities because they could have lost all their land if the government does not help to cut land from the companies’ concession with the private titles”.  

This statement is noteworthy in various ways. First, it refutes the assertion that the negative impacts are unintentional. On the contrary, it illustrates that these impacts and the undermining of communal land titling efforts are intentional and volitional consequences. Second, it reveals a problematic perspective of parts of the authorities on the Cambodian legal framework and customary land rights. The Cambodian Land Law 2001 stipulates interim protection for indigenous groups prior to their land being collectively titled: “groups existing at present shall continue to manage their community and immovable property according to their traditional customs and shall be subject to the provisions of this law.” Furthermore, Art. 28 states specifically that no rights to land belonging to an indigenous community can be transferred to anyone outside of the group. The duty to enforce these provisions rests with the state, its authorities and the courts. Any actions of the state which would make the indigenous peoples’ management of their immovable property impossible represent a breach of law by the state. For the communities described above, Directive 01 undermines their rights and efforts to receive communal land titles. This holds further effects on the work and contributions from development partners as well as NGOs that financially and technically supported the CLT process. If the situation is not being rectified and the distribution of private titles continues on land inhabited by Indigenous Peoples than it is likely that no land is being left to be communally titled. NGOs and development partners input is substantially undermined as it is to be expected that the number of communities which can formally receive communal land titles will be reduced after D01 comes to an end. The support already given to communities, who cannot proceed further now as the CLT process has halted, is diminished if the communities cannot receive communal titles. A recent study in Ratanakiri province found that out of 79 villages in different stages of the CLT process, 26 villages with a total of 3,053 families were affected by D01. 52% or 1,586 families had their land titled for private titles.

At this point, it is difficult to assess whether this statement reflects the position of the MLMUPC generally. Subsequent information from MLMUPC indicates that this might not be the case. In a meeting with NGOs a representative from MLMUPC emphasizes that Directive 01 will be implemented in the spirit of Instruction 15 and not issue private titles to members of IP communities who are registered as legal entities with the MoI or those in the process of registering. The role of the volunteers is to record the demarcation done by the community members. In April 2013, a telephone hotline was established for community members to report on cases of illegal logging and shortcomings of Directive 01 implementation. It was further indicated that the head of the Cambodian government called for an acceleration of CLT. In Mondulkiri, 580 individual plots were withdrawn from the 30-day public display period over concerns that they belong to members of IP communities. Officials from the MLMUPC confirmed that private titles could subsequently be converted to communal titles, but that a legal procedure has yet to be developed. Countering this official narrative, Vize and Hornung (2013: 9, 21)
argue that the Directive 01 “has great potential as a tool to further weaken and divide already disenfranchised indigenous communities” and “is being used in some communities as a tool to trick indigenous communities out of their rights to collective titles”. The question arises how IP communities that have not been registered with MoI can maintain their right to receive communal land titles. To improve their situation, efforts in supporting the communities claim to be registered as legal entities would need to expedited and strengthened. Given the implementation speed of Directive 01, there is an imminent risk that the claims to communal titles may fall by the wayside. As spiritual, burial grounds and areas for shifting agriculture are not included in the private land titling scheme, those areas might be lost to concessionaires if a conversion would be made possible only in the distant future.

For communities that are involved in a dispute with concessionaires and did not have their private plots measured, their tenure security is not strengthened by Directive 01. Instead, Directive 01 perpetuates and aggravates land disputes. Donors need to carefully assess whether a continuation of funds made available for CLT makes sense if the actions by the Government intentionally compromises the CLT process. Even though the overwhelming majority of IP communities want to have their lands communally titled, it remains to be seen how much communal land will still be available after D01 comes to an end. Following the logic of MLMUPC, IP land which is not individually titled will be occupied by companies and will not be available for CLT.

Müller and Zülsdorf view the distribution of land by D01 as a tremendous step towards the realization of human rights for poor and vulnerable people. While access to land secured by a land title might implicate that beneficiaries can exercise their human right to adequate housing and food production at the subsistence level, other aspects of this right need to equally addressed to realize human rights. For instance, the core elements of the right to adequate housing comprise besides the legal security of tenure: availability of services, materials, facilities, and infrastructure; affordability; habitability; accessibility; location; and cultural adequacy. Those are not being addressed by handing out land where communities in many cases already reside.

Against the backdrop of the described impact of D01 on IPs, a careful differentiation needs to be made between those that benefit in terms of improved tenure security and those that do not. In line with the information received from MLMUPC on 2 May 2013, Müller and Zülsdorf maintained that “MLMUPC is working on getting the campaigners back to the originally-announced procedure that demands the exclusion of those IP communities that have reached various steps towards collective land ownership in line with Land Law of 2001 and other policies and regulations in effect. Still there is no solution for those IP communities that are not under this process yet”. Future developments will show whether the.

105 Rabe, Alison Pg 21 Directive 01BB in Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia , Issues and impacts of private land titling in indigenous communities, 2013., for the study area
government is indeed willing to put in place effective measures to ensure the full respect of IP communities wishing to receive communal land titles. Given the persistent contradictions between official rhetoric and local implementation practice, it is unlikely that this will happen any time soon.

VIII. Conclusion and Policy Implications

There is overwhelming evidence that the system of granting ELCs has been exploited by a few, well-connected elite groups to the disadvantage of the poor and vulnerable parts of the population, the environment as well as the public budget. State institutions have been unable to restrain this process due to weak governance and collusive behavior of parts of the state authorities and the private sector. In this regard, Cambodia has become a captured state. To overcome these challenges, a rigid political will would be necessary to re-establish the rule of law and the respect for basic human rights and to enforce existing regulatory frameworks without exemption.

Directive 01 is an attempt to formalize the common and long-term occupation of state land. The initiative targeted to legalize the occupation of land with “unclear status”. It does not comprehensively attempt to resolve conflicts involving concessionaires and fails to address the root causes for these conflicts. Thus, it does not overhaul a system that has been responsible for overlapping claims to and use of land and other natural resources. Instead, there is reason to fear that it risks perpetuating and aggravating resource conflicts, distributional inequities and tenure insecurity affecting the majority of the rural poor.

Finally, the principles for responsible agricultural investment as promoted by a number of international actors, including the World Bank, FAO and several donor countries, appear not to be the right instrument to stop the continued concentration of Cambodia’s natural resource in the hands of foreign investors and local elites. If investors do not adhere to mandatory international and domestic law, why should they adhere to a set of voluntary principles?

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